We consider semivalues on pM 1 -a vector space of games with a continuum of players (among which there may be atoms) that possess a robust di¤erentia-bility feature. We introduce the notion of a derivative semivalue on pM 1 ; and extend the standard Banzhaf value from the domain of …nite games onto pM 1 as a certain particularly simple derivative semivalue. Our main result shows that any semivalue on pM 1 is a derivative semivalue. It is also shown that the Banzhaf value is the only semivalue on pM 1 that satis…es a version of the composition property of Owen (1978) and that, in addition, is non-zero for all non-zero monotonic …nite games. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C71, D72.
Introduction
The e¢ ciency of the Shapley (1953) value is one of its central properties. The need for e¢ ciency is obvious in most applications, where the Shapley value is viewed as a tool for distributing the proceeds of full cooperation in the game between its players.
Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel. Email: orih@exchange.bgu.ac.il However, there are contexts in which the value is not (or, at least, not obviously) a sharing mechanism. As suggested by Roth (1977a Roth ( , 1988 , the value can be viewed as an evaluation of the prospect of playing the game by the various players, in which case possible inconsistency in subjective evaluations may stand in the way of e¢ ciency. Indeed, the famous Banzhaf value, 1 which is non-e¢ cient in general, may appropriately describe a case of strong "strategic risk aversion" (see Roth (1977b Roth ( , 1988 ), where all players have an unduly pessimistic view of their bargaining abilities. In the context of simple (voting) games, the restriction of the Shapley and Banzhaf values to that domain (which leads, respectively, to the Shapley and Shubik (1954) power index and a version of the Banzhaf (1965 Banzhaf ( , 1966 Banzhaf ( , 1968 power index) intends to capture an even more vaguely de…ned "voting power" of the various players, in which case the a priori assumption of e¢ ciency is also strongly questionable. It was for these reasons that Dubey et al. (1981) commenced the …rst systematic study of semivalues -solution concepts with value-like properties (namely, linearity, symmetry, positivity, and being a projection on additive games) with e¢ ciency excluded. Dubey et al. (1981) fully characterized all semivalues on the space of …nite games (with a …nite or in…nite universe of players), and all semivalues on pN A -a space of games with a nonatomic continuum of players that was introduced in Aumann and Shapley (1974) (which they discovered to be su¢ ciently rich and also amenable to mathematical analysis for producing insightful and sharp results). In the context of …nite simple games, an identical characterization of all semivalues was later obtained by Einy (1987) .
Among the non-e¢ cient semivalues, the Banzhaf value has received the most attention. Nevertheless, it has only been formally de…ned and treated in the context of …nite games. The de…nition of the Banzhaf value of a player in a …nite game is simple and clean, and is expressed as the expected marginal contribution of that player to a random coalition which each other player joins -independently of the rest -with probability 1 2 : In a simple game, this yields one of the classical de…nitions of voting power (see Banzhaf (1965) , Dubey and Shapley (1979) ) as the probability that the given voter "swings" the vote in a random coalition of Yes-voters, under the assumption that all voters cast their votes independently, with probability 1 2 for Yes and for No.
An attempt to extend the Banzhaf value to games with in…nitely many players immediately runs into two di¢ culties, both of which might explain why it has never been carried out. First, the natural counterparts of marginal contributions in …nite games are directional derivatives of the (appropriately extended) characteristic functions when games with a continuum of players are concerned, but these directional derivatives need not always exist even for games in pN A; which is the closure in the bounded variation norm of the vector space of polynomial functions of nonatomic measures. 2 Second, there is no natural way to extend the existing axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value for …nite games into the framework with a nonatomic continuum of players, as at least one central axiom seems to be meaningful only for …nite games.
This particularly stands out in the famous axiomatization of Lehrer (1988) . The central axiom, superadditivity, states that no two players will be harmed if they "merge"
and act as a single player; this axiom does not apply to sets, but only to singletons.
As no player is individually signi…cant in the nonatomic continuum setting, the game in which two players have merged into one is identical to the original game, and thus the superadditivity axiom loses all its bite.
In one of the earliest axiomatizations of the Banzhaf index, by Owen (1978) , the main axiom would also become inadequate in the nonatomic continuum scenario.
Owen's main axiom, the composition property, uses a compounding of games played on two tiers, and is de…ned as follows. Consider a game v with player set N = f1; 2; :::; ng; and, additionally, let there be n other games w 1 ; :::; w n with disjoint player sets S 1 ; :::; S n ; such that w i (S) 2 [0; 1] and w i (S i ) = 1 for every i: Player i is viewed as the delegate of S i into the …rst-tier game v that describes the payo¤s to all possible coalitions of delegates in N: In the second-tier game w i ; w i (S) is the probability that a coalition S S i "controls" S i 's delegate i in N; i.e., forces him to act entirely on S's behalf (in particular, S = S i controls i with certainty). The 2 The existence of a directional derivative was established by Aumann and Shapley (1974) for almost every point of the "diagonal" (i.e., the set of all "perfect samples" of the grand coalition), which is su¢ cient for the de…nition of the Aumann-Shapley value on pN A. However, de…ning the Banzhaf value requires di¤erentiability at the exact midpoint of the "diagonal" (corresponding to the perfect compound game v [w 1 ; :::; w n ] has [ n i=1 S i as its player set. Given S [ n i=1 S i ; each i 2 N is controlled by S with probability w i (S \ S i ) ; and it is assumed that the events of taking control of di¤erent delegates are independent. 3 The payo¤ to S in 4 This property requires the prospect of a player j 2 S i in v [w 1 ; :::; w n ] to be determined based on his prospect in his secondtier game w i and the prospect of his delegate i in the …rst-tier game v: Speci…cally, j obtains the prospect of i in v with probability equal to his own prospect in the "control game" w i :
The idea of compounding appears to be much less suitable in the framework with a nonatomic continuum of players. When there are no atoms, the …rst-tier game v must have a continuum of individually negligible but collectively powerful delegates as its player set. Putting aside the question of whether a continuum of delegates (and hence, a continuum of disjoint delegate-selecting groups S i ; each of which is itself a continuum) may be a reasonable approximation of any realistic scenario, an immediate problem is that the expected worth of a coalition obtained by randomly and independently selecting delegates from a continuum cannot be de…ned in a natural manner.
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In this paper we will use a framework that overcomes the aforementioned dif…culties that are inherent in extending the domain of the Banzhaf value to games with a continuum of players. As in Aumann and Shapley (1973) , we shall consider games that are polynomial functions of measures, but, in passing to limits of such functions, we will replace the bounded variation norm by a stronger k k 1 norm, …rst de…ned in Monderer and Neyman (1988) . It was shown in Monderer and Hart (1997) 3 When w 1 ; :::; w n are simple games, the setting becomes deterministic: delegate i 2 N is being controlled by S if and only if S \ S i is a winning coalition in the game w i : 4 This means that the probabilities of i being controlled by S ( S i ) and S i nS are complementary. 5 Assuming that the player ("delegate") set of v is the interval [0; 1] together with the -algebra B of Borel sets (i.e., a standard measurable space as in Aumann and Shapley (1974) ), the event that the random process of independently choosing delegates generates a coalition S 2 B (which ensures that v(S) is de…ned) will typically be nonmeasurable w.r.t. the product -algebra that is behind the random process; see, e.g., Judd (1985) .
that k k 1 -limits preserve di¤erentiability, and hence the k k 1 -closure of the space of polynomials in measures (that are di¤erentiable) will consist of di¤erentiable games, paving the way for de…ning the Banzhaf value along with a host of other derivativebased semivalues. Furthermore, we will not con…ne ourselves to nonatomic measures as those works did, but consider the space of polynomials in mixed measures which have a nonatomic and a purely atomic part (as in Hart (1973) ). The k k 1 -closure of that space, denoted pM 1 ; can thus be referred to as the space of di¤erentiable mixed games. 6 It contains both pN A 1 (i.e., the k k 1 -closure of the space of polynomials in nonatomic measures) and the space of all …nite games (i.e., games with a …nite support in the continuum). The inclusion of all …nite games in pM 1 is of great utility since this fact allows the composition property to be stated for games in pM 1 ; indeed, when the …rst-tier game v; for which the …niteness of the player set is a natural assumption, is indeed assumed to be …nite (and hence, in particular, in pM 1 ), its compounding with second-tier games in pM 1 gives rise to a well-de…ned
The …rst contribution of this work is to introduce the notion of a derivative semi- , when the participation rate of nonatomic players and the participation probability of atoms are identical and equal to 1 2 , a semivalue
) is obtained, which naturally extends the Banzhaf value for …nite games onto the domain pM 1 : We will refer to as the Banzhaf value on pM 1 .
When t 1 6 = t 2 ; the semivalue ' (t 1 ;t 2 ) does not violate the symmetry assumption (i.e., covariance under all automorphisms of the player set) despite that the atomic and the nonatomic part of the game are treated di¤erentially. This is because the automorphisms move atoms into atoms and nonatomic players into nonatomic players, creating no link between the prospects of the two parts. Furthermore, the following generalization of ' (t 1 ;t 2 ) will also preserve symmetry. Let us allow the nonatomic and the atomic players to have (possibly inconsistent) probabilistic assessments of the participation rate t 1 of the nonatomic continuum / participation probability t 2 of atoms, and denote by (respectively, ) the probability distribution over all possible
2 that represents the assessment held by the nonatomic players (respectively, by atoms). an in…nite universe of players, based on the fact that multilinear games 9 are dense in these spaces. Here, too, for any semivalue ' on pM 1 we will construct an operator on the domain of …nite games in pM 1 that is uniquely identi…able with ' and that is a semivalue except for a restricted symmetry feature -the covariance of will be limited to automorphisms that preserve some partition of the player space into two in…nite sets (the restricted symmetry of is an expression of the disconnect between nonatomic and atomic players that may be exhibited by the original semivalue '
9 De…ned in Monderer and Neyman (1988 characterization of (fully symmetric) semivalues on …nite games, 10 will then be used to show that the semivalue ' (to which corresponds) has the form ' ; :
We will also provide a counterpart to Owen's (1978) result for …nite games, and
show that the Banzhaf value is the only semivalue on pM 1 that satis…es a version of the composition property (see Proposition 1 and Theorem 2). As was mentioned earlier, our notion of compounding requires a …rst-tier game v to be a …nite game in pM 1 (whose atoms will be the "delegates" of the second-tier games); but places no restriction on the second-tier games in pM 1 other than those dictated by the nature of compounding and the premises of the composition property. 11 Our result requires an additional, though minor, assumption that the semivalue is non-zero for all non-zero monotonic …nite games.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the central concepts and notation pertaining to games with a continuum of players, combined with a synopsis of relevant basic facts. In particular, the section formally de…nes the space pM 1 , the extension of a game in pM 1 to ideal coalitions, and the directional derivatives of the as a derivative semivalue. Section 5 is devoted to the characterization of the Banzhaf value as a semivalue that satis…es the composition property, which is the content of Theorem 2. The concluding Appendix contains the proofs of two auxiliary lemmas. 10 Speci…cally, it will be shown that each player is assigned his expected marginal contribution to a random coalition that the other players are joining in a conditionally independent manner, with the same conditional probability for the members of the same "type" (i.e., a set in the partition). ;
will be the mixing distributions of the parameters (t 1 ; t 2 ) of the two-type i.i.d. process of forming the random coalition, that describe the (possibly di¤erent) probabilistic assessments held by the two player types. 11 The possibility to include nonatomic and purely atomic probability measures among the secondtier games is instrumental in our proof.
Preliminaries
The concepts and notation introduced in Aumann and Shapley (1974) form the basis of our setting. It also contains some subsequent additions that are rooted in the works of Monderer and Neyman (1988) , Monderer (1990) , and Haimanko (2000).
Games with a continuum of players
Let (I; C) be a standard measurable space (i.e., one that isomorphic to ( generally, = ( 1 ; :::; n ) 2 (M ) n ; we will denote
The set of all (bi-measurable) automorphisms of (I; C) will be denoted by . Each 2 induces an operator : BV ! BV; where v is given by ( v)(S) = v( S) for every v 2 BV: A subspace Q of BV will be called symmetric if (Q) = Q for every 2 .
The bounded variation norm on BV is de…ned by kvk BV = inffu (I) + w (I) j u; w 2 BV are monotonic and v = u wg:
The space BV is a Banach algebra w.r.t. the norm k k BV :
Given games v and w; v is said to be a Lipschitz game w.r.t. w (written v w) if w v is monotonic. Denote by AC 1 BV the set of all games v satisfying v for some positive 2 M: The norm kvk 1 = sup fv (S) j S 2 Cg + inff (I) j 2 M is positive and v g turns (AC 1 ; k k 1 ) into a Banach algebra, and kvk BV kvk 1 for every v 2 AC 1 :
Denote by pM (resp., pM 1 ) the closure w.r.t. the norm k k BV (resp., k k 1 ) of the linear span of all games of the form q ; where q is a polynomial vanishing at 0; and
The spaces pN A and pN A 1 are de…ned likewise using measures 2 N A.
Clearly, G I pM 1 pM; and the spaces are symmetric. If f 2 C 1 ([0; 1] n ) and 
Extension of games to ideal coalitions
Let B(I; C) be the space of all bounded, measurable, real-valued functions on (I; C), and consider B 
where g 2 B 1 + (I; C); B is the indicator function of an event B; and E is the expectation operator. Intuitively (though by no means formally 12 ), v (g) can be thought of as the expected worth of a random coalition S which each player x 2 I joins, independently of others, with probability g (x). The players from the nonatomic continuum I n A( ) that join S are regarded as a deterministic perfect g-sample of the continuum, while the atoms in A( ) that join S are a genuinely random coalition.
The Mertens extension is de…ned, in particular, on the space G I of …nite games on I: It is just the familiar multilinear extension of Owen (1972) . Given v 2 G I and
then
for any g 2 B 
for any (y a ) a2T 0 nT ; and hence v (g) is independent of the choice of T:
The Mertens extension v 7 ! v is linear and positive (i.e., it maps monotonic games into monotonic ideal games). It is also symmetric, i.e., v (g) = v g 1 for every independent of g j S ; and by the continuity of the Mertens extension the limit v (g) is also independent of g j S :
Di¤erentiability of games
for every nonnegative h 2 B(I; C) such that g + "h 2 B 1 + (I; C) for some " > 0; and
for every nonnegative h 2 B(I; C) such that g "h 2 B 1 + (I; C) for some " > 0; moreover, dv (g; h) is additive in h: This was established in Section 2 of Hart and Monderer (1997) for v 2 pN A 1 ; but similar arguments apply for v 2 pM 1 .
is given by the following formula that easily follows from (1) and (5), (6) . For a nonnegative h 2 B(I; C) with h j A( ) 0 such that either
where h ; i denotes the scalar product on R n and fZ a g a2A( ) are as in the premise for (1); while for h = c fbg ; where b 2 A ( ) and c 0;
In words, for a nonatomic ideal coalition h the directional derivative dv (g; h) is the expected derivative of f in the direction (h) ; evaluated at a random coalition that includes a perfect g-sample of the nonatomic players and is joined by each atom a with probability g (a) : If h is supported on A ( ), then dv (g; h) is the expected sum of h-weighted marginal contributions of the atoms to that random coalition.
Compound games
The notion of a compound game was introduced by Shapley (1964) in the context of simple …nite games, and extended by Owen (1964) to general …nite games. We will generalize the notion of compounding for games in pM 1 :
Let v 2 G I be a game with some …nite support T: Consider a collection ( (a)) a2T
of disjoint sets in C and a collection w (a) a2T of games in pM 1 such that, for every a 2 T; the game w (a) 0 is supported on (a) and w (a) (I) = 1: (As each game w (a) is indexed by a set (a) ; the games w (a) a2T can be viewed, in accord with our notation, as restrictions of some w 2 pM 1 to disjoint sets ( (a)) a2T .) The game u 2 pM 1 is said to be the compounding of v with w (a) a2T if
for every S 2 C; where f v;T is the multilinear extension of v de…ned in (2) . Notice that u 2 pM 1 since pM 1 is a Banach algebra.
When w (a) a2T are …nite simple games (i.e., each w 
describes the outcome of the compound voting.
The compound game f v;T ( w (a) a2T ) has meaning, however, even in the general scenario, when the supports ( (a)) a2T are in…nite sets, possibly containing nonatomic parts and atoms, and the (not necessarily …nite) games w (a) a2T obtain general values in [0; 1] : Each game w (a) can be thought of as determining the probability that a subcoalition of the group (a) "controls" its delegate a in the …rst-tier game v (e.g., this may mean that the subcoalition successfully accomplishes a project a that was assigned to (a), at which point that project begins its "interaction" with projects in T accomplished by other groups, determining the …nal payo¤ via v).
The following fact, stated as a lemma and proved in the Appendix, will be of use in the sequel.
Lemma 1. Let v; T; ( (a))
a2T and w (a) a2T be as in the premise for (9) , and consider the compound game u = f v;T ( w (a) a2T ): For any g 2 B 1 + (I; C) that obtains …nitely many values, and any S 2 C which is a subset of (b) for some b 2 T;
Multilinear Games
In treating multilinear games we will adopt the de…nitions in Monderer and Neyman (1988) and Haimanko (2000) with some minor modi…cations, and will use the (conveniently available) notation of the previous section pertaining to compounding. Let 2 M 1 be a measure for which N A (I) > 0 and the set A( ) (= Supp( A )) is in…nite.
A game u will be called -multilinear if 13 
; where v 2 G I ; T is a …nite support of v, and ( (a)) a2T is a collection of disjoint sets in C; such that
The set 14 M L( ) of -multilinear games is dense in pM ( ) 1 (=the space de…ned in the same way as pM 1 but with an additional requirement that the measure in a polynomial generator q is absolutely continuous w.r.t. ); see Proposition 8 in
Haimanko (2000).
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Remark 2. Any semivalue on ' on pM 1 is uniquely determined by its restriction ' j M L( ) to games in M L( ) for 2 M 1 as above. Indeed, since any semivalue on
; ' is uniquely determined by ' j pM ( ) 1 due to its symmetry. 13 Recall that, for any S 2 C; S stands for the restriction of to the set S; given by S (S 0 ) = (S 0 \ S) for every S 0 2 C: 14 It can easily be shown that M L ( ) is, in fact, a vector space. 15 Although Proposition 8 of Haimanko (2000), and Theorem 4 of Monderer and Neyman (1988) upon which it is based, are stated for convergence in k k BV ; both results hold (with the same proofs) for convergence in the norm k k 1 on pM ( ) 1 :
Semivalues

The general de…nition
Given a symmetric subspace Q of BV , we say that a linear operator ' : Q ! F A is: Hence, in particular, any semivalue ' on pM 1 is continuous and ' (pM 1 ) = M .
Derivative semivalues
In what follows we introduce a class of semivalues on pM 1 (that, as will be made 
As each dv (t 1 (I n A(v)) + t 2 A(v); ) is additive, ' ; (v) 2 F A; and hence (10) de…nes an operator ' ; : pM 1 ! F A:
Note that the integrals in (10)- (11) is also positive since so is the Mertens extension, and the directional derivatives in a direction S 2 C are nonnegative for any monotonic ideal game. Finally, ' ; is a projection on F A \ pM 1 = M; as d (t 1 (I n A( )) + t 2 A( ); S) = (S) for any 
The Banzhaf value on pM 1
The Banzhaf value, which is one of the most prominent semivalues in the context of …nite games, can be extended to the entire pM 1 as a particular derivative semivalue.
Let us denote = ' (
2 ) and call it the Banzhaf value on pM 1 : From (10)- (11), applied to the measures and that are concentrated on ; we obtain
for every v 2 pM 1 and S 2 C:
the combination of (12) with (7) and (8) yields the following explicit formula: if
where fY a g a2A( ) are f0; 1g-valued i.i.d. random variables with mean
; and if a 0 2
This boils down to the standard de…nition of the Banzhaf value for …nite games: if
and (v) (S) = 0 for any S 2 C with S \ Supp(v) = ?:
It has been shown by Owen (1978) that the Banzhaf value for compound …nite games has a strikingly simple multiplicative decomposition, which translates in our general context into the following de…nition. We say that a semivalue ' on pM 1 has the composition property if, given any v 2 G I with some …nite support T; a collection ( (a)) a2T of disjoint sets in C and a collection w (a) a2T of games in pM 1 such that, for every a 2 T; w (a) 0 is supported on (a) and is constant-sum with w (a) (I) = 1; the following holds for the compound game u = f v;T ( w (a) a2T ) :
for every a 2 T and S 2 C that is a subset of (a).
The composition property provides a simple computational link between the semivalue of the compound game and the semivalues of the …rst-and second-tier games.
Namely, a subgroup of (a) is assigned the semivalue of its delegate a in the …rst-tier game with a certain probability. That probability is equal to the semivalue evaluating the subgroup's contribution in the second-tier game to the success of controlling its delegate. : Thus, for each b 2 T and S (b) ; In what follows we shall note how to represent Hart values as derivative semivalues.
In describing Hart values we follow the "path approach" of Haimanko (2000).
Given two continuous and monotonic functions
(i.e., the image set of the path s 7 ! F 1 (s); F 2 (s)), and are determined by the equalities
given by
for every v 2 pM 1 and S 2 C: This is precisely the de…nition of the symmetric 4 Characterization of semivalues on pM 1
Our …rst theorem will show that derivative semivalues exhaust the set of all semivalues on pM 1 : Its proof draws on the ideas of Haimanko (2000), who constructed an isomorphism between the sets of (partially symmetric) values on certain subspaces of pM 1 and (partially symmetric) values of …nite games. The construction that we will present is simpler, and more explicit and detailed. Given a semivalue ' on pM 1 ; we will show that it induces an operator on G I that, despite not being a true semivalue, satis…es a restricted form of symmetry, namely, covariance under automorphisms that preserve a certain partition of I into two types of players. (Intuitively, the two types of players in G I will represent the nonatomic and atomic players of games in pM 1 ; that may be treated di¤erentially by ' despite its symmetry.) It will then be shown that has a measure-based representation akin to some ; -induced derivative semivalue. Importantly, the connection between ' and is such that the measurebased representation of can be translated back to obtain the ; -induced derivative semivalue form for ': Now consider a semivalue ' on pM 1 : It induces a -symmetric semivalue on G I in the following fashion. Given a game v 2 G I and its …nite support T that satis…es T n A( ) 6 = ?; choose a countable measurable partition of I that re…nes 16 and, in addition, satis…es the following: jf 2 j I n A( )gj = jT n A( )j ; f 2 j A( )g = ffag j a 2 A( )g; and N A ( ) > 0 for all 2 with I n A( ): Take any one-to-one and onto mapping :
We will de…ne (v) 2 F A \ G T by involving an appropriate -multilinear game: let 16 Namely, I n A( ) or A( ) for every 2 :
for every b 2 T .
We shall …rst show that is well-de…ned. Indeed, consider another support T 0 for the game v (w.l.o.g., T T 0 ), and let 0 ; 0 be some appropriate counterparts of ;
above, leading to
by (4), in fact
for every b 2 T 0 :
Let a 0 be some dedicated atom in T n A( ) 6 = ?: Since each uncountable 2 [ 0 together with the corresponding measurable subsets is a standard measurable space, for any a 2 T n A( ); a 6 = a 0 ; there exists 17 a bi-measurable isomorphism
on (a) ; and there also exists a bi-
on (a 0 ) : By letting (x) = a (x) whenever x 2 (a) for some a 2 T nA( );
and (x) = x for every x 2 A( ); an automorphism 2 is constructed; it satis…es
for every a 2 T: Thus, when b 2 T; b 6 = a 0 ;
The right-hand terms in (15) and (16) are therefore identical when b 2 T; b 6 = a 0 ; and hence (v) (fbg) = 0 (v) (fbg) in this case. 17 Use, e.g., Proposition 1.1 and Lemma 6.2 in Aumann and Shapley (1974) .
For b = a 0 ; the symmetry of ' similarly implies that
Notice that, for some A > 0;
and hence
because ' is a positive projection. When b 2 T 0 n T; (18) implies that
It follows that ' f v;T
[ a2T 0 nT 0 (a) = 0; and thus (17) leads to
which shows (via (15) and (16)
When b 2 T 0 n T; 0 (v) (fbg) = (v) (fbg), as these are, respectively, the left-hand and the right-hand sides of (19) . Hence 0 (v) (fbg) = (v) (fbg) for every b 2 T 0 , and we have thereby shown that is well de…ned.
It is obvious that : G I ! F A \ G I is linear, as ' is linear and f v;T is linear in v 2 G T for any …nite T I. The operator is also a positive projection, since
is a monotonic game for a monotonic v 2 G I and is a measure for an additive v 2 G I ; and ' is a positive projection.
Finally, we will show that is -symmetric. Indeed, let v 2 G I and consider any 2 such that (A( )) = A( ): Pick a …nite T I such that Supp(v) T;
Supp ( v) = 1 (Supp(v)) T; and T n A( ) 6 = ?; and let and be as in the de…nition of in (15) . For any a 2 1 (Supp(v)) n A( ) there exists a bi-measurable
on (a) ; now take some b 2 that coincides with a on the set (a) for every a 2
and with on the set A( ): Thus
It is also easy to verify that
Hence, due to (4),
( (a)) a2T ;
and we conclude that
Thus, for every b 2 1 (Supp(v)) ;
we have established that is -symmetric.
To summarize, it has been shown that is a -symmetric semivalue on 
if a 2 I n A( ); and
if a 2 A( ):
According to Lemma 2, the -symmetric semivalue on G I that is induced by the given ' is equal to ; for some uniquely determined
Now consider any v 2 G I ; together with any set T; partition and mapping de…ned as in the premise of (15), and denote u = f v;T : Notice that for
+ (I; C) that is constant on I n A( ) and on A( ), and for every b 2 T;
where the …rst equality follows from Lemma 1 (and the obvious fact that d 
for every 2 (T ) and every g as above; if 2 n (T ); (25) still holds as both derivatives in it are then equal to 0.
If 2 and
[by (25) 
and, similarly, ' (u) ( ) = ' ; (u) ( ) if 2 and A( ) (i.e., = fag for some
for every 2 : Note that u = u for every 2 that preserves the measure 
Characterization of the Banzhaf Value
Our second theorem singles out the Banzhaf value on pM 1 based on two requirements: the composition property, and being non-zero for every non-zero monotonic …nite game.
that ' (0;0) satis…es the composition property. As ' (0;0) (v) (fag) = v(fag) for every v 2 G I and a 2 I; it is obvious that ' (0;0) (v) = 0 if v 2 G I is any game for which v(fag) = 0 for every a 2 I: Thus, the requirement that ' (v) 6 = 0 for every monotonic By the de…nition of the Banzhaf value, (f ) = 0:
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. We will …rst show that
Observe that, since f v;T in (2) By (27) ,
and by an elementary chain rule argument 20 In order for the chain rule argument to work, either (5) or (6) must hold, requiring that either g + "S or g "S be in B 1 + (I; C) for some " > 0: As g obtains …nitely many values, (29) can be proved separately for coalitions S on which the value of g is constant (and hence g + "S or g "S are as required), and then extended by additivity of the directional derivative to any S 2 C:
It follows from Remark 1 that dw (a) (g; S) = 0 for a 6 = b since S Claim. For each p m;n ; q m;n as above, N p m;n ;q m;n is a -symmetric semivalue on G N : Moreover, every -symmetric semivalue on G N is of this form, and the mapping (p m;n ; q m;n ) 7 ! N p m;n ;q m;n is one-to-one.
We proceed by mainly adopting the arguments in the Alternative Proof of The- 
